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Feminism, Law, and the State 
 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Canadian feminist pro-choice 
movement identified the state and especially the law as its principal 
adversaries, calling for decriminalization of abortion and demanding 
that the state 'keep its laws off women's bodies'. Parliament never 
acceded, and ultimately it was left to litigation in the courts, in par- 
ticular criminal prosecution and a Charter challenge, to detern1ine 
the status of the Canadian abortion law. The celebrated Morgen- 
taler1 victory in the Supreme Court of Canada led to a partial 
realignment of feminist posture vis-a-vis the law, however. The cri- 
tique of the legal system became more selective: juries were 
applauded, the Supreme Court became preferred over certain 
provincial Courts of Appeal {notably those of Ontario and Quebec), 
and the call for 'No New Law' was amended to 'No New Criminal 
Law'. As astute students of Canadian politics, Canad ian feminists 
and pro-choice activists alike realized that decriminalization alone 
did not guarantee women's access to abortion. While the Criminal 
Code continued to be resisted, the Canada Health Act, the bedrock 
of Canada's medicare system, came to. be seen as having a different 
legal complexion. Thus, feminists in Canada developed a more 
refined appreciation of the distinction and relationship between 
coercive and other forms of law. 
This chapter examines the legal legacy of the Morgentaler deci- 
sion, and the challenges it poses for feminist analysis of and engage- 
ment with law. The Supreme Court's decision, profound as it was, 
did not create a right to abortion for Canadian women, nor did it 
offer any resolution of the abortion issue. While feminists were gal- 
vanized to resist any new law, the problem of how to ensure 
women's access to medically insured abortions loomed larger than 
ever before. Several provincial governments were equally moved to 
restrict both doctors and women, while the medical profession like- 
wise resisted any new criminal law which might put its members at 
risk of either criminal prosecution or harassment. 
Several of these protagonists found themselves in curious posi- 
tions in their relationship to the law. While Henry Morgentaler con- 
tinued to be prosecuted by the Crown in Nova Scotia, he himself 
applied to the Court when the New Brunswick government refused 

















women at his Montreal clinic. While the Right to Life 
movement continued to press for new foetal rights and men's 
rights, several of its supporters, participants in Operation Rescue 
(characterized by one author as 'Operation Oppress You')2 found 
themselves on the other side of the law, prosecuted and convicted 
for their defiance of court orders to stay away from abortion 
clinics.3 It is my argument that no groups found themselves in a 
more contradictory position vis-a-vis Canadian law and the 
Canadian state than did feminists and their allies who found 
themselves enjoying an unprecedented series of legal victories. 
The implications of a feminist turn to law to challenge power and 
to create new rights claims have been carefully and critically inter- 
rogated by left and feminist scholars alike.4 British feminist Carol 
Smart, noting that 'it is almost as .hard to be against rights as it is 
to be against virtue',5 urges feminists to be wary of the appeal of 
the rhetoric and legal practice of 'rights'. Smart argues that femi- 
nists have ceded .too much to law at the expense of rnore important 
alternative extra-legal strategies, and they now find themselves in a 
difficul t contradiction: 'the appeal to law on the basis of basic 
rights was no less than an appeal to the state to re-order power rela- 
tions.'6 Whether in the areas of sexual assault, child custody or 
reproductive freedoms, Smart argues that. law transforms femi- 
nism's claims and issues, and imposes new and superior redefini- 
tions; and it is 'this power to define [that] is part of the power of 
law . . .'.7 She u rges feminists to 'discourage a resort to law as if it 
holds the key to unlock women's oppression', to 'de-centre law 
wherever this is feasible' and thereby to resist 'the move towards 
more law and the creeping hegemony of the legal order'.6 
Yet, Smart draws back from analysing the state as a site of 
women 's subordination and feminist struggle. While she illumi- 
nates the uneven and refracted relation of law to women and argues 
against imprecise and simplistic conceptual frameworks such as 
'power as commodity', 'law as tool', it is clear that she also regards 
'the state' as analytically vacuous and anachronistic: 'a concept like 
the state is so imprecise and misleadingly implies a monolithic 
unity of interests and regimes. . . '.9 
 
The cogency as well as the limits of Carol Smart 's argument 













grapple with the weaknesses, per haps even false promise, of the 
Charter  of Rights and  Freedoms. 10  Judy Fudge argues that  by 
advancing women 's equality claims through Charter litigation, fen1- 
inists have neglected both the nature of the state's contribution  to 
the maintenance of women 's subordination and the significance of 
the  particular  form of the  public/private split  entrenched in the 
Charter. She illustrates that  the  inequalities and  despotism  of the 
private sphere remain beyond  the scrutiny of the Charter,  irre- 
spective of whether one's concept of the private realm includes the 
family as well as the market. She cites, for example, the state's leg- 
islatively expressed commitment to the primacy of 'private' respon- 
sibility for spousal or child support, which is nothing less than a 
commitmen t to state-enforced patriarchal   relations.  In the same 
way some feminists do, the state wants men to be responsible for 
children, to be accountable, and most importa ntly, to pay. But, in 
her view, '[i]t is impossible to regard a [ju dicial) decision that rein· 
forces women's econom ic dependency upon men by privatizing the 
obligation for support as a progressive victory.'11 
This chapter illustrates that a concern with the law-state relation 
is still appropriate, indeed imperative. Smart reminds us that the 
state is often asserted to be, and less often illustrated as, a 
leviathan-like source of power, for men or capital or both. Rather 
than ignoring it because of these analytic problems, however, it is 
still better to insist upon an analysis of the law-state relation. This 
is particularly so in the Canadian context because the abortion 
issue cannot be understood as separate ftom the state, its form, its 
division of powers,12 its social policies and coercive practices, and 
the law, both legislative and adjudicative. 
To detach the law from the state is effectively to participate in 
efforts to depoliticize the former. Indeed, as this book argues, the 
medicali7Ation of abortion, the use of criminal prosecution and the 
courts, the 'free vote' in Parliamen t, have all been aspects of the 
state's strategy to depoliticize both abortion struggles and abortion 
law. Ferninists n1ust both recognize this strategy and work with con· 
ceptual tools that allow it to be exposed and thereby analyzed. The 
specificity of both state and law need to be acknowledged. Thus, 
withou t collapsing law into the state, or the state into law, it is nec- 
essary to examine each in relation to the other. 














women and men in the abortion injunction cases,13  illustrate  the 
importance of the posture and action of the state vis-a-vis abortion. 
Such cases demonstrate how recriminalization explicitly defines the 
interest of the Canadian state in abortion and, implicitly, defines 
an interest of men who, regarding themselves sufficiently affected, 
attempt to intervene to ensure compliance with the law.14 Beyond 
the issue of criminalization are state decisions about whether or not 
to provide medicare funds for 'non-therapeuti c' abortions,15 to per- 
mit the establishment of free-standing abortion clinics,16 and oth· 
erwise to create conditions of meaningful access.17 The resolution 
of the abortion issue is more likely to be determined by political 
struggle than by legal right. In this the role played by the state is 
of central importance. 
An analysis of this role and the nature of the law-state relation is 
aided by the concept of ideology, which illuminates the contradic- 
tory nature of law. Understanding the significance of law as a site 
of ideological struggle permits a reconcilation of the contradictory 
experiences and assessments of pro·life and pro-choice legal chal- 
lenges. Therefore, this chapter proceeds from the proposition that 
law within Western capitalism is principally, but not exclusively, an 
ideological form.18 It sets normative stand ards and informs, shapes, 
and constrains the content of collective and conventional thinking 
about social structure and the possibilities and necessity for change, 
and it is simultaneously informed by these conventional ideas and 
beliefs about social relations.19 Not simply nor even accurately char- 
acterized as a 'reflection' of society, or its 'ham1ner ', the law (includ· 
ing its agents-lawyers, legislators, and jud ges) is both a product 
of and reproducer of the existing social order.20 
Conceptualizing law and ideology assists us in analysing the cur- 
rent abortion debates, as well as demonstrating the extent to which 
the law is a site of struggle. The sectio.ns which follow describe the 
ways in which the pro-life moven1ent has mad e claims ·1•1ith increas- 
ing authority that 'abortion is murder' when this is not, and has 
never been, the definition provided in Canadian criminal law. They 
also describe how the startlingly novel claim that the foetus is a per- 
son has gained popular currency, notwithstanding the consistent 
position in law that a live birth is a prerequisite for personhood. 
Ideologies become dominant not necessarily through law, and 
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dominan t ideologies may nonetheless be imported or incorporated 
into law. Interestingly, the strongest weapon in the anti-choice 
rights arsenal in Canada has not yet proven to be a legal one. 
After reviewing the M orgentaler decision in detail, we will exam- 
ine related litigation, including the pro-choice and pro-life cases, the 
fathers' rights cases, and cases involving the provincial clawbacks of 
M orgentaler and med icare. Notwithstanding the many legal defeats 
experienced by anti-choice advocates, and the recent spate of legal 
victories achieved by pro-choice advocates, the extra-legal cultural 
struggle that is currently being waged may prove to be the decisive 
one.21 To argue that both the law and the state are sites of struggle 
ought not to lead to the position that they are inevitable, necessary, 
or exclusive sites; the legal victories are never conclusive. In other 
words, while the law cannot he ignored, it should not mesmerize 
those endeavouring to achieve social change. 
 
From Victory to Defeat to Victory: 1Horgentaler in the Courts 
Although there was unevenness in levels of feminist activity in the 
years following the 1969 amendments to the Criminal Code, Cana- 
dian feminist and pro-choice activists consistently identified the 
inequality created by the abortion law and called for decriminal- 
ization.22 They voted with their feet in the streets, in hundreds of 
demonstrations and several blustery {arch 8 International Women's 
Day marches. The cold feet really belonged, however, to male 
elected representatives in Parliament. For all their lobbying efforts, 
political activity, careful analyses and docume.nted inequality, Cana- 
dian women met the stony intransigence of a federal government 
ostensibly committed to equality in its legislation, yet lacking  the 
political will to move on this important issue. 
In the early 1980s, the wo1nen's movement paid increasing atten- 
tion to the abortion issue. Feminists were frustrated by their failed 
efforts to have abortion decriminalized, and were foiled in their 
atte1npts to work within the existing law.23 Activists in English 
Canada looked to the successful free-standing clinic experience in 
Quebec and decided to extend the Quebec experiment to other 
commun ities, specifically Winnipeg and Toronto. In Toronto, the 
Committee for the Establishment of Abortion Clinics was formed 
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received the support of Henry Morgentaler and two other doctors, 
and the Morgentaler Clinic on Harbord Street in Toronto was 
opened. A public campaign was launched, and the challenge to the 
federal law was explicit and direct. 
As in the 1970s in Quebec, a raid on a Morgentaler clinic resulted 
in criminal charges. And, once again, following a prolonged but 
unsuccessful pretrial motion to quash the indictments against 
them,24 Dr Morgentaler and his two colleagues, Ors Leslie Smoling 
and Robert Scott, were acquitted by yet another jury. Once again, at 
the hands of a Court of Appeal, the verdict was set aside;a ne'v trial 
was ordered .25 The Ontario Court of Appeal was not moved by 
defence arguments that the Charter of Rights had altered in a sig- 
nificant way the fabric of the law. In fact, the Court of Appeal com- 
forted itself with the knowledge that abortion had long been a 
criminal offence and offered this analysis of the right to life, liberty, 
and security of the person under section 7 of the Charter: 
Some rights have their basis in common law or statute law. 
Some are so deeply rooted in our traditions and'vay of life as to 
be fundamental and could be classified as part of life, lib· 
erty and security of the person. The right to choose one's 
partner in marriage, and the decision whether or not to have 
children, would fall in this category . . . 
We agree with Parker A.C.J.H.C. in the court below that, 
bearing in mind the statutory prohibition against abortion in 
Canada which has existed for 100 years, it could not be said 
that there is a right to procure an abortion so deeply rooted in 
our tradi tions and way of life as to be fundamental.26 
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal also h eld that Dr Morgentaler's 
understanding of the law relating to the defence of necessity was 
'misconceived'. The Court, clearly offended by the doctors' scrupu- 
lous advance preparation to rely upon this defence, held : 
Taking the most favourable view of  the ev iden ce for the 
defence, the respondents were dissatisfied with the present law 
relating to abortions in Canada.27 
It was left to Morgen taler to proceed with an appeal to the 
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provisions of the Criminal Code violated the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, in particular section 7, which provides: 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the per- 
son and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accor- 
dance with the principles of fundamen tal justice. 
Although the named appellants before the Supreme Court were 
Drs Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott, the case was argued in the 
name  of women whose access to abortion, including therapeutic 
abortion, was inhibited by the operation of the provisions of section 
251. Clearly, the voluminous evidence led at trial by the doctors 
convinced the majority of the Court that the procedure enunciated 
in section 251was, in the words of the Chief Justice, •manifestly 
unfai r'.28 While Justice Mcintyre in dissent insisted that any prob- 
lems identified  with the abortion law were caused by 'external' 
forces, specifically 'a general demand for abortion irrespective of 
the provisions of section 251',29 Dickson held that 'many of the 
most serious problems with . . . section 251 are crf.'-ated by the pro- 
cedural and adnlinistrative requirements established in the law'.30 
Although the heart of Dickson's ju dgment centred upon the 'man- 
ifest unfairness' of the procedures, the lack  of any  definition of 
health, and the inherent delays in the 1969 amendments, his judg e· 
ment had some unequivocal resonances for women: 
Forcing a woman, by threat of criminal sanctipn, to carry a 
foetus to term unless she meets certain criteria unrelated to 
her own priorities and aspirations, is a profound interference 
with a woman's body and thus a violation of her security of 
the  person.31 
Despite this apparently strong criticism of compulsory preg- 
nancy, it is important to remember that Dickson would have upheld 
the legislation had its procedures complied with the principles of 
fundamental justice; the fact of criminalizat ion per se was not 
rejected. Beyond this, Dickson, as all members of the Court, con- 
templated that state protection of 'foetal interests' 'might well he 
deserving of court protection'32 under section 1of the Char ter 
which: '. • . guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject 
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as car1 be demon- 











In other words, provided that restrictive abortion legislation con- 
tained a standard or procedure that was fair and not arbitrary, Dick- 
son might well uphold it in the name of state protection of the foetus. 
Madam Justice Wilson's ju dgement focused  less on  procedural 
unfairness which might be remedied. Unlike her brothers on the 
bench, Wilson rested her decision on the right to liberty within sec- 
tion 7, and insisted that the right to ind ividual liberty is 'inextri· 
cably tied to the concept of human dignity',33 which for Wilson 
included the right to make fundamental personal decisions rithin 
a sphere of personal autonomy: 
The right to reproduce or not to reproduce which is in issue 
in this case is one such right and is properly perceived as an 
integral part of modern woman's struggle to assert her dignity 
and worth as a human being (emphasis in original).34 
Wilson also held that a woman's security of the person was vio- 
lated by section 251. In particular, the requirement of a therapeut- 
ic abortion committee meant that: 
She is the passive recipient of a decision made by others as to 
whether her body is to he used to nurture a new life. Can 
there be anything that comports less with human dignity and 
self-respect?35 
Wilson's 'sphere of personal autonomy' did not involve an atom- 
ized libertarianism . She situated her individual  'woma n'  wi thin 
her context36 while insisting that within this social or collective 
context, the individual (pregnant woman) had to be able to make 
decisions which might well defy the imaginative capacities of 
(non-pregnant) men. Nonetheless, Wilson too contemplated  that, 
as in Roe v Wfide, a wornan's right of access to abortion was not 
to  he  absolute: 
At some point the legitimate state interests in the protection 
of health, proper medical standards, and pre-natal life would 
justify its qualification.37 
For Wilson, section 1 of the Charter would authorize 'reasonable 
limits to he put upon the woman's right':38 
 










her decision, reached in consultation with her physician not to 
carry the foetus to term would be conclusive. 'f he state would 
have no business inquiring into her reasons. The precise point 
in the development of the foetus at which the state's interest 
in its protection becomes 'compelling' I leave to the informed 
judgement of the legislature which is in a position to receive 
guidance on the subject from all the relevant disciplines. It 
seems to me, however, that it might fall somewher e in the sec- 
ond trimester.39 
 
As for the rest of the bench, both Beetz J. (writing with the major- 
ity) and Mcintyre J.(in dissent) held that protection of the foetus 
was the primary purpose of the abortion legislation; Beetz found 
the procedural problems in section 251 fatal. Mcintyre, the only 
judge to use the language of the pro-life movement, would have 
upheld the legislation design ed to protect the interests of the 
unborn child: 
There has always been a clear recognition of a public interest 
in the protection of the unborn and there has been no indica- 
tion of any general acceptance of the concept of abortion at 
will in our society.w 
In the end, section 251was struck down. 
Although few people anticipated complete success with the Char- 
ter challenge, it is clear in retrospect that it was an all-or-nothing 
proposition. In an oddly dialectical way, the seed for this success- 
ful assault on the abortion section had been sown in Justice Dick- 
son's own analysis of it as 'a comprehensive code . . ., unitary and 
complete within itself in his 1976 judgement which upheld Dr 
Morgentaler's conviction in the first round .41 
The result was, of course, an historic decision in which the 
Supreme Court of Canada struck down in its entirety section 251. 
It mark ed the culmination of two decades of hard-fought feminist 
struggle in which the legal victories had been few and the politi- 
cal victories even fewer.42 However, it quickly became clear that 
this, like many victories, particularly legal victories, was fragile, 
incomplete and contradictory.1'he victory \Vas fragile because the 
federal government, though bruised, attempted for two years to 










provincial governments responsible for hospitals, to refuse or limit 
funding for abortions in the absence of a therapeutic exception in 
the Criminal Code further attested to the fragility.43 It was an 
incomplete victory because th.e unequivocal commitment of all the 
Supreme Court judg es to 'foetal interests' or the 'state's interest 
in the foetus' invited Parliament to limit women's access to abor- 
tion (and indeed other med ical procedures) in the later stages of 
pregnancy and opened the door to other legislative proposals, 
which purported to can•e out a 'specific' foetal interest, if not full 
legal personality.44 
Finally, the victory was also contradictory in that the Court 
reinforced the notion that abortion is a .medical matter. Contra- 
dictions abound in this maintenance of a medicalized conceptio n of 
abortion . On the one hand , Canadian feminists and pro-choice 
activists have articulated a long-standing critique of the implica- 
tions of denoting of abortion as a medical or therapeutic matter.4.5 
Yet, on the other hand, in very important and paradoxical ways the 
continued denotation of abortion as a health matter has been sig· 
nificant in the Canadian context. Health care in Canada has come 
to he regarded as a social right, enshrined in a comprehensive and 
fully funded health care system based upon principles of accessi- 
bility and universal ity.46 In the years following the Supreme 
Court's decision, the issue of women's right of access to health care 
has fuelled the pro-choice n1ovemen t. Indeed, the fragility of 
women' s access to abortio.n has helped to illustrate the more gen· 
eral fragility of med icare in Canada. 
By focusing on these contradictions we can better understand the 
situation  Canadian women  face. Obviously, the language of the 
Morgentaler judgements of the majority was a ringing restatement 
of an individual right to life, liberty, and security of the person and 
is thus consistent with  the emphasis on abortion as a private and 
individual matter.47 While this reflects the language of lawyers and 
judges, it has not been the character ization of Canadian pro-choice 
and feminist activists, who have consistently framed abortion as an 
issue of equality and  access.  Access to abortion by Canadian 
women should not be as vulnerable to the kind of legislative and 
judicial erosion as in the United States, where the US Supreme 
Court began to undermine Roe v  W&de49 in a series of decisions 










Med icaid funds for all but medically necessary   abortions,  t here· 
by and  thereafter  depriving  poor American women access to 
medically insured  abortions .50  ln 1989,  the  US  Supreme Court 
upheld Missouri legislation which prohibited  pub]icly funded 
health-care centres and public employees from providing abortion 
services.51 The Canadian politi cal and social context is different in 
an important respect by virtue of the comprehensive public health- 
care system.  And  so in Canada we are in the rather paradoxical 
position of r1ow having to insist that abortion is a health-care mat- 
ter, in  order to  ensure  equal access and  availability of pu blicly 
funded  abortions. 
 
Right to life versus the Law 
The 1969 abortion law was also assailed by the right to life move- 
ment who insisted that even the limited therapeutic provisions of 
the Criminal Code went too far. The thrust of their campaign, legal 
and otherwise, has been to limit women's access to legal abortion, 
to advocate striking down the therapeutic abortion provisions, to 
co.nstru ct and advance new rights for m en (qu,a husbands and 
fathers) and for the foetus, and to threaten and harass everyone 
involved in the delivery of abortion services. These challenges to 
Canadian abortion law are as important as the pro-choice chal- 
lenges have been. 
One important early extra-legal tactic of the right to life inove- 
ment was to exert constant, concerted pressure on hospitals to dis- 
mantle their Therapeutic Abortion Committees. Paradoxically, a 
hospital's decision to dismantle its committee (often after a strug- 
gle for control of the cornposition of the hospital board) some- 
times became a source of tension between hospital boards and 
doctors. Doctors were able to force the reinstatement of abortion 
com n1ittees by refusing to sit on other hospital committees. The 
outcome in at least one such case, however, was the appointment. by 
a hospital board of a new committee with 'conservative' views on 
abortion.52 Moreover, during a doctors' strike in Ontario in the fall 
of 1986 (provoked by the prohibition of extra-billing in the medi- 
care system) one of the first services affected was the Therapeutic 
Abortion Committee.53 This experience again demonstrated the 











status of women's access to legal abortion. 
The most tenacious legal challenge undertaken by the anti-choice 
m ovement was to be found in the Borowsk i case. In 1981, the 
Supreme Court of Canada granted standing to long-time pro-life 
activist Joseph Borowski to bring an action challenging the validity 
of the therapeutic abortion amendments to the Criminal Code. 
Speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court, Martland J. held 
that Borowski did not have to establish that he was directly affected 
hy the abortion legislation in order to bring his legal challenge 
because he met a second test: 'he has a genuine interest as a citizen 
in the validity of the legislation and . . . there is no other reason- 
able manner in which the issue may be brought before the court.'54> 
With the entrench ment of the Charter of Right s, Borowski 
amended his action to argue that the therapeutic abortion amend- 
ments were unconstitutional under sections 7 and 15, violating a 
foetus' right to life and equality. 
He was unsuccessful at trial.55 Moreover, in the spring of 1987, 
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, holding 
that a foetus is not an 'everyone' entitled to the protection of sec- 
tion 7 or section 15 of the Charter.56 Because the Morgentaler 
appeal was heard by the Supreme Court before the Borowski 
appeal, the decision in the former sealed the fate of the latter. 
Once the legislation he undertook to chal1enge had been struck 
down by the Su preme Court in J\forgentaler, Mr Borowski's own 
appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed as moot.57 
The legal argument advanced by Borowski and others for foetal 
personhood goes thus: Protective mechanisms available to the 
unborn which crystallize at birth are already recognized by law. 
There is no logical reason why legal personality and the rights 
which flow therefrom should not be concomitant in time.58 The 
medical and health needs of a foetus are analogous to and continu- 
ous of those of a child; thus, the child and the foetus should be con- 
sidered juridical persons in the same sense and for the same 
reasons.59 While any 'right to property' thus far afforded to the foe- 
tus is and has been a contingent right60-contingent on live birth 
-this requirement is regarded as anachronistic.61 Indeed, Joe 
Borowski's counsel insisted he was arguing the new 'Persons Case' 











Foetal Personhood : The Ideology of Foetal Rights 
 
Feminists across a range of disciplines63 have noted the many and 
contradictory ways that the new visibility of the foetus has rendered 
pregnant women invisible, likened them to 'ambulatory chalices'64 
or flower pots<» and, less benignly, seen them as the principal adver- 
saries of the foetus. Advocates of legal recognition of foetal per- 
sonhood such as the American 1ega1 academic John Robertson66 and 
Canadian law reform consultant Edward Keyserlingk 67 have turned 
their minds to a whole panoply of forms and degrees of maternal 
misconduct.In his assertion that 'mothers are arguably those wit h 
the most serious and extensive duties and obligations toward the 
unborn, and therefore the likeliest class of defendant',68 Keyserlingk 
clearly regards pregnant women as the likeliest adversaries and 
perpetrators of 'foetal neglect'. 
The current characterization of hostility and antagonism betv•een 
pregnan t women and foetuses is one which has been carefuUy con· 
structed. In right-to-life legal arguments and factums, in literature 
(legal and otherwise) and films, the pregnant woman is increasingly 
put in the position of adversary to her own pregnancy either by pre- 
senting a 'hostile environment' for foetal development or by actively 
refusing medically proposed intervention.69    Clearly,  upon closer 
analysis, the conflict is not one between maternal and foetal rights,?() 
but rather between women and self-appointed curators of the foe- 
tus or guardians of 'foetal interests' . 
The ubiquitous presence of the foetus in the abortion debate is 
of rather recent provenance; the earlier medical and legal literature 
and case law having focused on the sexual immorality which gave 
rise to abortion rather than the value of embryonic life.71 Now it 
seems, the foetus itself has become the apparent target of the 
engagement, our culture having 'discovered' what women have long 
kno\vn: babies do not come fron1 hospitals; they are 'with us' 
throughout 'their' pregnancy. Moreover, prior to its birth the foetus 
is already the new kid on the block. Foetal personhood advocates 
emphasize the 'biological' unity of the 'pre-born' and 'bom'72 and 
de-emphasize the biological unity of woman and foetus. 
Feminists both acknowledge the fundamental unity of woman 
and foetus and insist that the relationship is not 'symmetrical' .73 











between a pregnant woman and a foetus is as significant as the 
insight that this relationship is neither symmetrical nor inherently 
antagonistic. Feminists are thus currently engaged in a concerted 
struggle to resist the emerging if not yet prevailing image of preg· 
nant women as menacing vessels, an image offensive to the integrity 
and moral agency of pregnant women. But feminists have also had 
to contend with the new invisibility of pregnant'vomen in this cam· 
paign; witness Edward Keyserlingk: 
In most respect s but one, the transfer from the protections of 
the womb to the protection of the crib and nursery, there is 
unbroken continuity between the unbor n and the child . 
(emphasis added)75 
Has the law similarly been rendered invisible, an empty vessel or 
an enemy alien, by the various contestants? Certainly, advocates for 
the recognition of legal personhood for the foetus have reason to 
feel that they have received a chilly reception in Canadian courts. In 
the Sullivan and LeM'ay case,76 involving two lay midwives who 
had been charged with criminal negligence in the death of the foe· 
tus during delivery, the Court restated the axiomatic position that 
prior to live birth, the foetus is not a human being for the purpose 
of the Criminal Code. In the father's  rights' cases of Daigle v 
Tremblay71 and Murphy v Dod d 18 both 'potential fathers' and foe· 
tuses ultimately had to yield to the rights of the wornen. 
While acknowledging the Canadian legal victories which have given 
rise to pro-life chagrin, feminist advocates and scholars need to be 
attentive to the various ways in which the foetal personhood campaign 
has been waged extra-legally, that is, culturally and politically. Here 
the ideological dimensions of the matter are particularly striking. 
Despite the claim that the foetus is the named object of their atten- 
tion, it is clear that the real objects of the foetal personhood cam- 
paign are women.79 Foetal personhood has implications for all women; 
all pregnant women experience some form of surveillance, but it is 
the poor who are most vulnerable to the 'pregnancy police'.80 
The new foetal imagery is not one-dimensional, however. Indeed, 
two powerful if ontradictory images of the foetus have emerged as 
part of what Rosalind Petchesky has characterized as a strategy to 
make foetal personhood a self-fulfilling prophecy by making the 











helpless, and innocent unborn child and the active, virtually 
autonomous foetus trapped in its mother's womb, begrudgingly 
serving a nine-month sentence of confinement. Petchesky argues 
that our collective understanding of the foetus has been in large 
measure constructed by the visual images presented and insisted 
upon by pro-J ife advocates. 
The potential cultural and political successes of the foetal rights 
movement, then, lie in its ability to both capture the imagination 
and tap the anxiety of people who are receptive to the notion that 
pregnant women are capable of extreme acts of selfishness and 
irresponsibility. The foetus is presented as helpless and vulnerable, 
the most innocent of innocent victims. Again, what is striking is 
that this campaign has been so successful without significant sup- 
port in Canadian law for its fundamental underlying premise: that 
the foetus is a person with legal rights. 
A window on this issue presents itself in part in the child welfare 
cases in Canada and the forced obstetrical treatment cases82 in the 
United States. A small hut significant body of case law to date 
reveals83 some judicial sympathy for the proposition that for the pur- 
poses of child-welfare legislation, a child is deemed to include the 
unborn.84 Jn both Canada and the United States it is clear that the 
women who are feeling the coercive edge of foetal attraction are poor 
women, women on welfare who have a 'history' with either welfare or 
child welfare authorities or both. Poor women,.homeless women, and 
mentally illwomen have supplanted the 'lewd' women who vexed pre- 
vious generations of lawmakers and law enforcers. And the net will 
widen if Edward Keyserlingk's view-that those who pose the great- 
est  threat to foetuses are their pregnant  mothers-prevails. 
Thus, although abortion is never far from its agenda, it is fair to 
observe that the foetal rights movement tackles more than abortion. 
In the United States, in the aftermath of the significant yet modest 
pro-choice victory in Roe v ITT:ide, the strategy bas been to work 
within and against the letter of Roe. While for some, the insistence 
that life begins at conception obviously means that there can he no 
compromise with Roe, for others the short-term concession of the 
first trimester to pregnant women  has enabled them to declare 
'open season' on the second and the third. The argument is that 
once a pregnant woman has foregone her optio11for an early, legal 
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her obligations (and, they argue, her legally enforceable duty) to 
her foetus. In John Robertson's word s, although a woman is under 
'no obligation to invite the fetus- in or to allow it to remain, once 
she has done these things, she assumes obligations to the fetus that 
limit her freedom over het body '.8S. Secondly, they are supremely 
confident that medical science will soon render the foetus viable at 
increasingly earlier points in pregnancy and, that as a result, the 
parameters for women to exercise their right to early abortion will 
be increasingly narrowed.86 Thus, in the US, right to life advocates 
have worked both within and against the letter of the Roe judg e- 
ment. As Janet Gallagher has argued: 
 
This attempt to use Roe as a legal weapon against pregnant 
women -to claim it as justifi cation for detention, criminal 
charges of 'abuse', drastic restraints on liberty, and even 
unconsented-to surgical invasion-stands the decision on its 
head, and not merely in terms of the right to abortion. Roe v 
Wade may have its flaws, but granting open season on preg- 
nant women after viability is not one of them.87 
 
Paternal Legal Claims: The Abortion Injunction Cases 
In this section, I revisit some ground recen tly well travelled by 
activists, courts and academics:88 the fathers' rights claims in the 
area of abortion. Reviewing the various judic ial victories achieved 
by women against the seeming odds of law and patriarchy illus- 
trates that the right of women to abortion unencumbered by the 
interference of men is one which principally and paradoxically has 
been acknowledged by the law alone. In other words, a woman's 
right to autonomy and self-determination in her fertility control is 
still a contentious claim within a society committed to the idealized 
(patriarchal) nuc.lear family. 
Given the great importance placed on the issue of fathers' rights 
by groups opposing the liberalization of abortion law, it is not sur- 
prising that the issue of h.usbands' and fathers' rights in the mat- 
ter of abortion has been raised in Canada . Indeed, after Marc 
Lepine murdered fourteen women at the Ecole Polytechnique in 
Montreal in December 1989 and injured a dozen more in his anti- 
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opined that he 'just might have been a man whose child had been 
aborted by a feminist '.89 
There is of course some irony  in the concern that anti-choice 
groups express on behalf of men who have 'lost their rights' in the 
context of legal abortion . Although there has never been an express 
requ irement for a husband 's consent  in abortion law .or medical 
procedure, they have not ever really been left out in the cold.9° 
Notwith stand ing the absence of any  legislative  requirement for 
either spousal or parental consent in the old abortion provisions, 
the Badgley Report found that in practice Therapeutic Abortion 
Committees across Canada operated \Vith diverse consent require· 
ments relating both to the age of the woman and to the father. More 
than two-thirds (68%) of the hospitals surveyed by the Committee 
required the consent of the husband. A few hospitals required the 
consent  of  a  husband from \vhom the woman was separated  or 
divorced and the consent of the father where the woman had never 
been married.91 
Despite these practices, under the previous therapeutic provi- 
sions of the Criminal Code, Canadian courts had held that a bus· 
band had neither a right to be consulted rtor a right of veto in the 
matter of his wife's application for a therapeutic abortion.92 They 
have been, however, more loath than courts in other jurisdictions93 
to rule these men completely out of court. In two early reported 
cases, Canadian courts adopted the reasoning of an English court in 
Paton v Trustees of B.P.A.S.,94 in which a husband applied unsuc- 
cessfully for an injunction to prevent his wife from proceeding 
with an abortion approved in accordance with the English abortion 
legislation.  In  1981, the  British Columbia Supreme Court dealt 
with an application by a husband for an injunction to restrain his 
wife and the Campbell River and District Hospital from proceeding 
with her therapeutic abortion.95 The BC court held that the facts 
were virtually identical to those in the Paton case and similarly 
held that the therapeutic abortion provisions of the Criminal Code 
could not accommodate a husban d's 'veto'. 
Three years later, an Ontario Court was faced ·ith a similar, 
highly publicized application.96 Alexander Medhurst commenced 
the action on his behalf and that of his unborn child for an injunc- 
tion to restrain his wife, her doctor, and the hospital from pro· 










court u ltimately held that as an unborn child is not a person, there 
was no legal entity for whom the husband could be appointed 
guardian. Although both husbands were unsuccessful in their legal 
challenges, a close reading of these t'vo early cases reveals judicial 
angst about abortion, along with considerable sympathy for the 
position  of  the  applicant husbands. 
The insistence by the women's movement that men take children 
and child care seriously has contributed to the now prevalent 
assun1ption that men as fathers actually do much more than they 
once did. As Carol Smart has illustrated in her work, the image of 
new fathers, especially'vith babies (as opposed to children) now 
informs popular culture.97 Thus it seems inevitable tha t we should 
have witnessed an apparent surge in men's interest in 'their preg- 
nancies' and 'their' unborn children and, for some, their struggles 
for custody before birth. Another tw ist to the law's relation to and 
regulation of women resu rfaced in the aftermath of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Morgenaler. Men (supported by the pro-life 
movement) once again began to litigate to prevent women from ter- 
minating pregnancy. To the women's movement's clarion call that 
'This uterus is not government property' , these 'post-Morgentaler' 
men responded : 'No, it 's mine.' To them, abortion was not a 
women's issue; it was their issue about their 'issue'. 
The apparent legal vacuum  created by the Supreme Court's deci· 
sion in 1988 spurred some men to litigious direct action. Consistent 
with the pre-Morgentaler cases,98 in all but one of these cases the 
men were successful initially. Judges who were confronted with the 
application, usually ex parte, were persuad ed to issue the interim 
order.99 The respondent woman had to apply to a different judge of 
the same court to set aside the initial ex parte restraining order.100 
When she lost again, as Chantal Daigle did in the Quebec Court of 
Appeal; she had then to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.101 
Only Justice Hirschfield of the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench 
of his own initiative (as the womru1 was not represented by counsel 
before him) was unequivocal in recogni7ing the woman's right to 
choose, although the importance of his caveat should not be lost: 
 
It is apparent to me that when the Respondent decided she 
was going to terminate the pregnancy she was exercising a 











that she was exercising the control over her body which she 
has the right to exercise. . . . [the] overwhelming consideration 
from my point of view is the fact that a human being, that is 
the Respondent has an absolute ri.ght, subject to criminal 
sanctions, to the control of her body. There is no criminal 
sanction against her exercising that right, in my opinion, as 
the law stands today, and until changed , she is entitled to do 
so. (emphasis added)IO'Z 
 
In the end, in the post-Morgentaler cases, none of the injunctions 
stood. The women won in court; the .men lost. 
To refuse to characterize these legal victories in the abortion 
struggle as defeats does not absolve one from the requisi te analysis 
of the nature of the victories and their manifest fragility and weak- 
ness. Nor is it to deny the fact that they often do not feel like vic- 
tories, even where the ex parte restraining orders are lif ted, 
enabling the woman to proceed unencumbered by legal sanction. It 
is also important to acknowledge the lack of legal determinacy in 
these cases; for instance, in a number of the injunction cases in both 
Canada and the United States, the woman proceeded to have an 
abortion, notwithstanding the fact that the case was still before the 
court.103 In one case where a Britisl1 woman survived the judicial 
ordeal with her legal rights intact, she elected not to have the abor- 
tion and gave the baby to the man, who in tum gave the child to his 
mother to raise.104 And of course, in Canada in the summer of 1989, 
the spectacular conversion by Barbara Dodd to the Right to Life 
Movement made news for weeks. Ms Dodd's attempt to obtain an 
abortion was initially thwarted by her boyfriend, who may or may 
not have been the 'father', and his lawyer, Angela Costigan. The pro- 
choice movement champion ed Dodd's cause, and she was eventually 
able to proceed with the abortion. Almost immediately following 
her successful struggle to resist her boyfriend and proceed with her 
abortion, she recanted, and made the cover of Maclean's.105 Legal 
victories clearly are not to be taken for real victories. 
On.e reason these legal victories often f eel like defeats is the clear 
empathy expressed in many of the cases for the men, especially the 
husbands, especially by the male judiciary.106 In the early Ontario 












The husband has a direct interest in the issue of the compli- 
ance with the [criminal] law which, in my view, entitles him to 
bring this application on his own beha]f, and his lack of any 
right to withhold his consent or to be consulted does not 
deprive him of the right to resort to this court to assert or pro- 
tect that interest . I cannot think of anyone more ent itled to 
the court's protec tion of that interest than a husband. . . . 
[ l]t is diff icult to think of anyone who could have an inter- 
est equal to that of a husband in the pregnancy of his wife.107 
(etnphasis added) 
Reid J.'s holding permitted the husband to apply immediately to 
review the Therapeutic Abortion Committee's decision in the mat- 
ter of his wife's application for a therapeutic abortion, and although 
he 'lost' in that round as well,108 he had been empowered by the 
judicial assertion of a husband's inherent interest and virtua] 'nat- 
ural right' in respect of his wife's pregnancy. This was so notwith- 
standing the fact of their marital separation, and  the  husband's 
clear attempt to force his wife back into the marriage. The legal 
form of the substantive la'v as it then was inhibited the husband's 
power. But the generosity of Canadian courts toward the granting 
of standing to men in the matter of abortion,109 including in the 
injw1ction cases under the Criminal Code, makes it clear that any 
recriminalizat ion of abortion will invite and facilitate proced11ral 
harassment of women seeking abortions and doctors prepared to 
perform them. 
Not only have men qua men been somewhat inhibited by law; so 
too have some American ju dges· who find they 'must, with reluc- 
tance' accept that '[t]he [US] Supreme Court has made it crystal 
clear that a pregnant woman, without the permission or consent or 
advice from anyone else' has a right to an abortion in the first 
trimester, while noting that '(m]any individ uals who specialize in 
religion or ethical concerns are appalled by the Supreme Court 
decisions'.110 In the course of h is reported judgement in Medhurst , 
Reid J. also insisted: 
It is not possible to approach this matter without personal 
convict ions-I am personally appalled at the prospect of 
abortion-or to be left unmoved by the emotion and anxiety 











In light of his views 'at the prospect of abortion', one imagines that 
Mrs Medhurst was relieved that the criminal law inhibited not only 
her husband but also the Bench. One doubts that it was her 'emo- 
tion and anxiety' that moved the judge in his remarks. 
Not every man who lost in court received condolences from the 
bench. The fact of allegations of violence contributin g to the sepa- 
ration (Mr Paton) and/or abortion (Mr Tremblay) was noted (with· 
out comm ent) by the tribunals/bench . The men who were trying to 
hold marriages together (Medhurst, Anderson,, Whalley) were 
regarded as sincere men in tragic circumstances. Significantly, the 
failure to conform to the ideal of the sincere family man was fatal 
to at least one American man's claim. 112 John Doe commenced an 
action in Indiana to prevent Jane Smith from proceeding to termi- 
nate her 10-12 week pregnancy. He managed to get himself before 
a justice of the US Supreme Court within two weeks. Jane Smith 
had become pregnant toward the end of their two-month relation- 
ship during which time he had been separated from his wife of six 
months, by whom he also had a child. He had since reconciled with 
his wife. Significantly also for Justice Stevens, John Doe had been 
'sporadically employed at low paying jobs for the last eighteen 
months'.113 
Following an earlier decision of the US Su preme Court in 
Planned Parenthood v Danf orth,'11'- Stevens J. noted that in order 
to 'require a mother to carry a child to term against her wishes, the 
father must demonstrate clear and compelling reasons justify ing 
such actions.•us Here, inter alia, the plaintiff 'has showed sub- 
stantial instability in his mental and romantic life. Based upon the 
plaintiff s romantic patterns over the last eight months, it would be 
impossible for the Court to predict the stability of his family unit 
at the time of birth.'116  Therefore, John Doe's claim was held to 
provide a 'particularly weak basis for invoking the extraordinary 
jud icial relief sought '.117 Had John Doe been a stable family man 
with a good and steady income, Justice Stevens, it seems, might 
have been persuaded to rule differently. 
The risk of relying on the characterization of the 'facts' of men 
presumably 'suffused by emotion and anxiety' (and indeed their 
equally suffused lawyers) in their quests to prevent their estranged 
wives or girlfriends from obtaining legal abortions has been illus- 











counsel for the applicant boyfriend, had served the court docu- 
ments herself upon Barbara Dodd on Friday afternoon before the 
July long weekend; the return date was the Tuesday morning imme- 
diately following the holiday Monday. On Tu esday, the presiding 
Judge noted in the endorsement of his order: 
The time is 10:40 a.m.; counsel for the Applicant advises me 
that she has had indirect commun ication \\ith the Respondent 
Dodd; neither Respondent appears nor does Dodd intend to 
appear by counsel. No one is here to represent the hospital.119 
In his affidavit in support of the application, Gregory Murphy 
deposed that he was the father of the Respondent's unborn child, 
that her doctor had said that an abortion wou ld endanger her 
health, and that he was from an 'intellectually superior' family.120 In 
the subsequent application by Ms Dodd to set aside the initial 
order, Gregory Murphy's conduct (and by implication his counsel) 
was characterized by her counsel as amounting to a fraud upon the 
court. In her affidavit, Ms Dodd deposed that another man might 
well have been responsible for the pregnancy (this was corroborated 
in an affidavit by the other man), and that. this had been 'the only 
issue connected'vith her pregnancy that [she and Murphy] fought 
about'.121 In their affidavits, both she and her doctor denied that he 
had said that the abortion would endanger her health . And finally, 
Ms Dodd, supported by expert evidence on her own intellectual 
ability and comprehension of the spoken word (she had a 90°/o 
hearing loss), was able to demonstrate that Murphy's lawyer (in her 
d irect communication during service of the documents) had not 
explained the nature of the documents served. A& a result, the ex 
parte order restraining Barbara Dodd from proceeding with the 
abortion was set aside, having been obtained by a fraud upon the 
court,  fraud  held  to  be related  to  material  issues.122 
In the abortion inj unction cases, many of the ju dges have 
accepted the men 's self-descriptions as 'fathers'  of the  'unborn' 
{infan t plaintiff, child). In its judgement in Tremblay v Daigle the 
Supreme Court of Canada pointedly reminded Canadians that these 
men are more accurately characterized as 'potential fathers'.123 How- 
ever, the answer to the question 'what makes a man a father?' 
seems not to lend itself to such appeals to reason. The Supreme 











country, and yet in the very real \\'orld there is fear that ideologi- 
cally and culturally, the hearts and minds of many Canadians seem 
to be with the men, the 'fathers' who are losing to selfish women 
and their feminist allies.124 
Feminist sociologist Barbara Katz Rothman125 argues that North 
.American society, and its legal system, have privileged biological 
paternity over social fathering, where pregnancy is seen as some- 
thing a tnan 'does' to a woman, by planting 'his' seed inher, where 
she has 'his' children. Rothman urges a ret hinking of fathering, one 
which de-emphasizes the 'genetic connection' and re-emphasizes 
the social relationship. Iremain unconvinced that a man can 'forge' 
a relationship 'vith a foetus, or that he can have his own 'experi- 
ence' of abortion.126 The foetus is intimately connected to and con- 
structed within the woman's body; it can only be intimately 
con.nected to and constructed within the imagination of the man. 
Despite his early (and undeniably pivotal) contribution to a 
woman's pregnancy, it can never be his pregnancy. His relationship 
with the foetus, if there is to be one, is inevitably mediated by the 
pregnant woman, and increasingly as well by law. 
The resistance we witness to the recent judicial pronouncements 
inhibiting men may illustrate what Michael Mandel has characterized 
as understandable resistance to the undemocratic nature of the 'judi- 
cial fiat'.127 And yet, the champions of the resistance in this instance 
(for example, REAL Women of Canada) are themselves less than com- 
mitted to the democratic process, much less the 'rule of law'. It is 
clear that they will continue to work in, against, and outside the law 
to  restrict  women's access to abortion. 
The abortion injunction cases and anti-feminist response remind 
us of the urgency of Smart's challenge to take up alternative, extra- 
legal strategies to defend and extend women's reproductive freedom. 
Women may have won in court, hut the real struggle continues, and 
real victories remain to be won. 
 
Clawbacks: The Provinces Respond 
Perhaps the most striking response to the Morgentaler decision is 
to be found in the provincial governments' reactions to the spectre 
of decriminalized abortion in combination with the promise of Dr 











noted,128 the Supreme Court's decision was less than facilitative of 
women's access to abortion. The Court had simply struck down one 
form of legal prohibition. The provincial governments of Quebec 
and Ontario indicated that they would continue to insure abor- 
tions under provincial medical insu rance plans. However, several 
provinces quickly set to work erecting local barriers to access. 
It is worth remembering that the 1969 reform had also been the 
subject of political agitation and legal challenge in some provincial 
legislatures prior to 1988. The nature of these early provincial 
initiatives, and their ultimate fate, both foreshadowed the post- 
Morgentaler activity and brought into sharp relief a tremendous 
contradiction. One concrete example will illustrate. In 1985, an 
anti-choice Conservative backbencher in the Saskatchewan legisla- 
ture in troduced a private member's bill that would have required a 
Therapeutic Abortion Committee to secure the 'informed consent' 
of the patient and spousal or parental consent.129 In addition, the bill 
would have imposed a 48-hour waiting period after consent had been 
given before the procedure could be performed.130 In a surprise 
move, the provincial cabinet referred the bill to the Court of Appeal 
follo,ving second reading. The Saskatche,van Court of Appeal ruled 
that the proposed legislation was ultra vires the province, as it was 
criminal law, and hence within federal jurisdiction.131 Otherwise, the 
Conservative majority in the provincial legislature would have passed 
this bill, which at least temporarily would have become provincial 
law. This early Saskatchewan case foreshadowed the debate that 
ensued in the aftermath of the M orgentaler decision. It also illumi- 
nated an interesting paradox: the criminal denotation of abortion 
inhibited some forms of provincial restrictions. 
Following the Supreme Court's decision in January 1988, no pre- 
mier moved more quickly than did Bill Vander Zalm of British 
Columbia. Vander Zalm announced that BC would not pay the costs 
of abortions; although he pledged that nobody would be permitted 
to die, he insisted, 'rape and incest are not life threatening. . . . We 
mil not be funding abortions.'1:fl While Vander Zalm's brash, uni- 
lateral initiative did not withstand judicial scrutiny,133 other 
provinces, like Alberta, worked more quietly to ensure that decrim- 
inalization did not tnean liberalizat ion. l34 Alberta had already 
experimented with 'de-insuring' certain medical services. In 1987, 










procedures had been de-insured  by the provincial government.13.5 
Following the Morgentaler decision, the Alberta Minister of Health 
announced  that provincial health insurance would pay only for 
abortions approved by hospital therapeutic abortion committees.136 
The province subsequently modified its position and issued regu· 
lations which allowed an abortion to he insured if the doctor per- 
forming it had first secured a second opinion. Beyond this,  Ian 
Urquhart suggests that the modest fee allowed under Alberta health 
insurance for therapeutic abortions has operated as a financial dis- 
incentive to abortion, and he concludes: 
in the aftermath of Morgentaler, the Alberta government has 
used the province's health insurance program as a vehicle for 
preserving the essence of the situation existing prior to 
Court's decision. Ty ing health insurance coverage to the per- 
formance of abortions in approved hospitals only after a sec- 
ond opinion has been offered, as well as retaining the modest 
fee schedule, combine to restrict access to this procedure, 
especially for women of modest means.t37 
The fate of a similar initiative by the New Brunswick government 
is of in terest. In the spring of 1989, Dr Morgentaler once again 
found himself in court; on this occasion he was a plaintiff, and the 
government of New Brunswick was the defendant. Morgentaler was 
tr} ng to extract his fees from the New Brunswick medicare system 
for abortions performed on three New Bruns'\\-ick women in his 
Montreal clinic in the spring of 1988. The provincial government 
had declined to reimburse him, qiting provincial policy that had 
been issued following the Suprem e Court 's decision: New 
Brunswick defined an 'entitled service' as one for which two physi- 
cians had certified its medical necessity, and the procedure had to 
be performed by a specialist in an approved hospital.138 These cri- 
teria applied to abortions performed outside the province of New 
Brunswick as well. As in the BC Civil Liberties case, the Court 
essentially found that the New Brunswick government had acted 
precipitously; the 'policy' had not been formally adopted as a reg- 
ulation under the provincial legislation. As there was no statutory 
basis  for  the requirements  that the province  had attempted to 
impose, Dr Morgentaler obtained the court order he was seeking, a 










was  invalid with respect to abortions  performed  outside the 
province of New Brunswick.139  Despite the absence of a statutory 
basis for the  policy, the  court  did not extend the declaration  to 
abortions  performed within New Brunswick. As a  result  of this 
decision, New Brunswick doctors  and New Brunswick women 
unable to leave the province continued to be caught by the policy. 
No government  resisted   the  implications of Dr Morgentaler's 
Supreme Court victory more tenaciously than did John Buchanan's 
Conservative government in Nova Scotia. Just as the Nova  &otia 
governmen t defied the Supreme Court ruling, so too did Dr Mor- 
gentaler defy in characteristic fashion the Nova Scotia legislation. In 
the spring of 1989, the provincial Minister of Health announ ced in 
the legislature that 'it is not the policy of this government to 
endorse or support in any way the provision of [abortion] services 
through free-standing clinics'14-0 when he introduced the bill that 
would eventually become the Medical Services Act S.N.S., c. 9 and 
regulations under it. The stated purpose of the Act set out in s. 2 
was: 'to prohibit the privatization of the provision of certain medi- 
cal services in order to maintain a single high-quality health-care 
delivery system for all Nova Scotias [sic]'.141 
A number of medical services were required under the Act to be 
performed in an approved hospita l: arthoscopy, colonoscopy, upper 
gastro-intestinal endoscopy, abortion, lithotripsy, liposuction, 
nuclear medicine, installation or removal of intraocular lenses, and 
electromyography.142 The Medical Services Act provided that there 
would be no reimbursement to any person 'vbo perfor med or 
received a designated medical service in contravent ion of the Act, 
and (S.6) that anyone who contravened the Act was guilty of an 
offence and liable upon summary conviction to a fine of not less 
than $10,000.00 and  not more than $50,000.00. 
Dr Morgentaler defied the Act and was charged after he per- 
formed abortions at his Halifax clinic. He was ordered by the 
Supreme Court of Nova &otia not to perfo.rm abortions until the 
charges against him were heard.143 Following his trial in the spring 
of 1990, the charges against  him were dismissed by Provincial 
Court Judge Kennedy on the ground that the Nova Scotia legisla- 
tion was really criminal law, and hence beyond the legislative juris- 
diction of the province.144 











unsuccessful. Freeman J.A. framed the question before the court: 
 
The question is not whether  Nova Scotia possesses legislative 
powers to pass a law in the form of the Medical Services Act. 
It clearly could have done so, even though it dealt with abor- 
tion. The question is whether the  province properly used 
those powers and created a law within  the. provincial compe· 
tence, or whether it improperly attempted to use federal pow- 
ers  to pass a law that, regardless of its  form, is actually  a 
criminal law. Only if it  bears  the unmistakable imprint of 
criminal law must it be struck down.145 
It was Morgentaler's position that the Act and Regulation were 
an incursion by a province into the field of criminal law, that it was 
'criminal law in the guise of hospital law'.146 The Crown's position 
was the Act WilS 'about privatization'147-essentially an attempt by 
the Conservatives to defend medicare against the incursions of the 
private sector. Freeman agreed that, 'examined uncritically and 
within its own four corners', the Medical Services Act appeared to he 
no more than a piece of legislation dealing with provincial hospi- 
tals.148 Ho'\\•ever, a more critical and contextual examination of the 
Act, its purpose and effect, its nature and character, led the majority 
of the Court of AppE>..al to conclude that it was .,;, rtually identical to 
the Criminal Code provisions that  had been struck down in M or- 
gentaler.149 Despite the apparent breadth and neutrality of the pro- 
visions, the Court found that the real focus of the legislation was 
Henry Morgentaler and its primary thrust was to prohibit his abor- 
tion clinics. Even the fines provided in the Act had been 'tailored to 
the  [provincial] Department  of Health's estimate of his resources'.150 
Once again  Morgentaler had successfully challenged a piece of 
abortion legislation, this time  'defending' the federal criminal law 
power. The irony of this position, necessitated as it was by the claw- 
back of the province and the exigencies of litigation, should not be 
lost. Perhaps more  than  anything else, it illustrates the inevitable 
compromises that engagement with the legal process involves. The 
constraints irnposed by the litigation and judicial processes lead to 
legal victories that are unreconcilable politically.The constraints go 
further, because the political imagination inevitably yields the prag- 
matism of the legal shrug: What else could be  argued? How else 










The indeterminacy of the Morgentaler decision was not 
inevitable. The Canadian feminist and pro-choice movement made 
history, but not under condit ions of their own choosing. The cyni- 
cism and mean-spiritedness of assorted conservative governments, 
and their commitment to erosion of even the modest social pro- 
grams ir1 place, meant that the legal victory of Morgentaler was just 
that, and no n1ore. The struggle for choice, for change, had to con- 
tinue. Once again, Canadian women found they could claim 'no 
easy  victories'.151 
 
Conclusiori 
The entrenchment of medical control of abortion has been identi· 
fied as fundmentally implicated in ensuring the continued subor- 
dination of women.152 For its part, the pro-life movement argues that 
there is no medical justification for abortion and is more than a lit- 
tle suspicious of what it sees as 'medical opportunists' who profit 
from a 'murderous industry' and who are in effect accomplices of 
women in abortion.1$3 Thus the merits of medical determination are 
explicitly challenged by both feminists, who have identified the 
moral arbitration embedded in medical practice, and right -to-life 
advocates. 
Although 1have argu ed elsewhere that both the criminalization 
of abortion and the implications of the therapeutic exception had to 
be understood and challenged, I have also argued that the notion of 
abortion as a medical matter has facilitated the formal erosion of 
one form of patriarchal auhority.The 1\-Iorgentaler decision pushes 
this issue a bi t further, because women have pointed to the spirit 
and letter of the Canada Health Act to legitimate demands for 
state-funded access to abortion as a health-care service. To be col- 
loquial, it may be that we have been released for the moment from 
the 'criminal' frying pan only to be burned by the 'health-care' fire. 
Nevertheless, as we consider the litany of struggles to resist the 
recriminalization of abortion, it will continue to be critical for fem- 
inists, activists and academics together, to explore and expand the 
social right to health care envisioned by the early advocates of 
co1nprehensive health care. 
An important, related question is whether all law is necessarily 










view for feminists to resist any recriminalization of abortion at any 
stage of pregnancy. However, it is now worth considering whether a 
positive, affirmative right to abortion ought to be advocated, either 
by way of amendment to the federal Canada flealth Act and/or 
provincial health legislation. The absence of criminal law did not 
guarantee ipsofacto a right of access to safe abortion, as the devel- 
opments after January 1988 illustrate. Indeed, the tone and lan- 
guage of the Supreme Court judg ements invited some of the 
ensuing provincial responses: to wit, 'if it's a private ma tter, we 
don't have to pay for it.' The creation of a positive, legally enforce- 
able right through the health-care system might render more pub- 
lic, and perhaps more political, the legitimate rights and desires of 
Canadian women. 
It is one of the great paradoxes in the Canadian context that the 
issue of women's reproductive freedom, including access to abor- 
tion, was long dominated by two men of opposing points of view: 
Henry Morgentaler and Joseph Borowski. Moreover, as Rosalind 
Petchesky has brilliantly illuminated, the image!')' of the foetal per- 
sonhood campaign attempts to render women invisible.154 But 
women have not acquiesced to invisibility, as Chantal Daigle 
demonstrated in the summer of 1989 when she resisted her  ex- 
lover, the pro-life movement, her Jawyer, and the courts. Chantal 
Daigle reminded us that women's individual and collective struggles 
for choice and self-determination may have been constrained, but 
have never been wholly confined nor determined by the legal and 
judicial  processes. 
So too, the struggle for decriminalization and for safe, universally 
accessible abortion is both an individual and collective one. One is 
not  possible without the other. 
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